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Has Tipton

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

sentencing discretion

When

it

relinquished jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
Tipton Has Failed To

A.

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Tipton was observed placing merchandise into his backpack by store security,
the police.

him With

(PSI, p. 3.)

Tipton attempted t0 ﬂee, but was apprehended.

burglary, petit theft, and resisting and obstructing an ofﬁcer.

The

Who

called

state

charged

(R., pp. 25-26.)

Tipton

(Id.)

pled guilty to burglary in a plea agreement Where the state dismissed the misdemeanors and agreed

to not ﬁle a persistent Violator

enhancement.

(R., pp. 27, 35-36.)

The

district court

imposed a

sentence of ﬁve years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 41-42.)

Less than two months into his

Tipton was involved in a “physical altercation” With

rider,

another inmate, was “considered a failure t0 program and a security risk,” and was transferred to
the general prison population.

(APSI,

p. 3.)

The

district court

relinquished jurisdiction.

(R., p.

47.) Tipton timely appealed. (R., pp. 49-50.)

Tipton argues that the
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)

He

district court

is

its

discretion

by

relinquishing jurisdiction.

speciﬁcally argues the district court did not “adequately consider” his

drug abuse and mental health.
mitigating factors

abused

Because

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)

how much

weight to give

the core of the district court’s exercise of sentencing discretion, Tipton’s

argument does not show an abuse 0f discretion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“The decision

t0 relinquish jurisdiction 0r grant probation is

judge’s discretion.” State
quotation marks omitted).

App.

2018)

(“The

V.

Le Vague, 164 Idaho

E

110, 113,

t0 the district

426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018)

(internal

211$ State V. Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct.

decision

t0

place

a

defendant

0n probation

to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the

court and will not be overturned

Whether a lower court abused

committed

its

or

Whether,

sound discretion of the

0n appeal absent an abuse 0f that discretion”).

instead,

district

In evaluating

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four—part inquiry,

Which

asks “whether the court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries 0f its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable to the

speciﬁc choices available t0

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise of reason.”

State V.

Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018)

(citing

Lunneborg

V.

MV Fun

Life, 163

Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

Tipton Has

C.

“A
the

trial

Shown N0 Abuse Of The

District Court’s Discretion

court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction Will not be

if

court has sufﬁcient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation

would be

inappropriate.” State V. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241, 248 (Ct. App. 2013).

In deciding t0 relinquish jurisdiction, the district court started

stretch to put [Tipton]

on a

rider in the ﬁrst place.”

incarcerated in the past for a signiﬁcant

been “relinquished 0n a prior

Based on
risk”

deemed an abuse 0f discretion

rider,”

On

was

was kind 0f a

Tipton had been

amount 0f time, had an “extensive prison record,” had

and had previously absconded parole. (TL,

rider program. (Tr., p. 32, Ls. 16-22.) “[I]n light

for relinquishment

that “it

(TL, p. 32, Ls. 6-8.)

his behavior during the retained jurisdiction, Tipton

by the

by noting

p. 32, Ls. 8-15.)

was deemed “a danger and

security

of everything” the recommendation

appropriate. (TL, p. 33, Ls. 11-14.)

appeal Tipton does not challenge the district court’s ﬁnding that he was a marginal

candidate for retained jurisdiction in the ﬁrst instance 0r that he

was

at the

time 0f relinquishment

a danger and a security risk t0 the rider program. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)
that the district court erred

by

failing to “adequately consider” his

He

argues instead

mental health and substance

abuse and the court’s ruling “‘essentially discounts any possibility 0f rehabilitation and successful
reentry into society.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8 (quoting

P.3d 521, 528

(Ct.

App. 2008).) This argument

is

Cook V.

State,

meritless, because

it is

145 Idaho 482, 489, 180

unsupported by the legal

authority cited.

In Co_ok the district court

imposed a combined 78-year sentence, With 29 years ﬁxed,

nine counts of grand theft by deception.

Li

at

485, 180 P.3d

at

524.

Cook had no

for

prior criminal

record.

Li

at

487, 180 P.3d at 526. Under his sentence he was ineligible for parole until he

“well into his seventies.” Li. The district court abused

180 P.3d

t0 run all consecutive. Li. at 488-90,

at

its

discretion

was

by ordering the nine sentences

527-29.

In contrast t0 Cook’s aggregate sentences of 78 years with 29 years ﬁxed, Tipton’s sentence

was ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed.

(R., pp. 41-42.)

Whereas Cook was a ﬁrst—time offender

Tipton had a criminal history spanning more than two decades. (PSI, pp. 4-7.) While

Cook could

not expect release on parole until his seventies, Tipton will be out before he’s ﬁfty even ifhe serves
the entire sentence.

would allow Tipton

t0

rehabilitate

at sentencing).)

The

district court’s

and successful reentry

the record. Indeed, he

through parole in his mid-forties, after two years of

is

into society” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8)

ﬁnds no support

failed rehabilitation.

program looks a

Two

(PSI, pp. 4-8, 60-62, 89-93.) His current failure

lot like his last one.

(PSI, p. 7 (reporting

years of incarceration t0

make himself

opportunity for rehabilitation in this case. Tipton has

littered

state respectfully requests this

with

0n the retained jurisdiction

he “ﬂopped a rider” for “ﬁghting and

parole eligible gave a very reasonable

shown n0 abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

in

the anti-Cook.

Tipton has a long history of criminal behavior, decades of theft and Violence

DORS”).)

sentence

Tipton’s argument that his sentence “essentially discounts any possibility of

incarceration.

rehabilitation

was age 43

(PSI, p. 2 (Tipton

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the
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